1. Introduction
Background and general aim
Studies in neuroscience and neural disorders typically investigate mean differences in a neural measure between healthy subjects and patients. It is assumed that the normal and pathological population form two distinct groups, between which such a measure differs by a large extent. For example, the amygdala is a key region in emotion regulation and its response (evoked activation) to stimuli are altered in different disorders (Ochsner et al., 2012) . In schizophrenia, hypoactivation of the amygdala is observed in response to emotional faces (Sugranyes et al., 2011) . Statistically, this approach relies on detecting non-overlapping areas of two Gaussian or normal distributions (Fig. 1A) . It also assumes that the normal and pathological populations are sampled from two different groups with significantly different mean values (Fig. 1B) . From such models, one can only infer that the groups differ from each other in that particular measure but it does not indicate how a mental function is affected. A linear regression model (which is commonly used) can extend this approach but would lead to the inference that higher values of the neural measure would occur in the healthy state and therefore, indicate much better mental function.
However, the accuracy of linear models depends upon measuring the entire range of values of the independent variable (neural measure, in this case), and can be used to predict the group (a binary distinction). However, studies typically assess a healthy group and patient group, which does not ensure that the entire range of the neural measure in question is included. In Fig. 1B , a linear model is positioned over the group differences. If higher values of the neural measure were to occur, then what would be the status or functioning of this group? Going back to our example where low and high activation in the amygdala in response to emotional faces occurs in schizophrenia and healthy groups, respectively, a traditional approach would suggest that an even higher activation in the amygdala would also predict a healthy group. However, this is not the case empirically, where higher activation than in the healthy group is seen in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) T (Etkin and Wager, 2007; Stein et al., 2007) . It becomes apparent that inadequate as well as excess activation of the amygdala is associated with pathological states, though in different disorders.
Thus, a binary approach comparing a single patient group to a healthy control group only reveals group differences, and a corresponding mental function can only be considered either present or absent. Furthermore, this binary approach does not reveal how expression of a neural measure over its entire range modulates the manifestation of a corresponding mental feature, which is affected in a disorder. Although implicit, the consequences of different degrees of neural measures, encompassing its average and extreme values, on mental features is left in the shadows by such a binary approach.
Another drawback of this binary approach is that between-subject differences are often regarded as errors of measurement (indicated by the whiskers of the boxplots in Fig. 1B , or as outliers). This approach does not account for between-subject differences even within the group, let alone that of individual differences across the entire study cohort. It can be seen in Fig. 1B that such between-subject differences show an underlying continuity from the patient group to the control group in the neural measure. While the difference in a neural measure between groups can be discerned, it is not immediately apparent how the neural measure may be related to a mental feature or function.
Going back to our example, the degree of activation in the amygdala can indicate three possible states -too low in schizophrenia, adequate in healthy, and too high in PTSD groups. This leads to an alternate interpretation of the data -considering the entire range of possible values of activation in the amygdala, the intermediate range is associated with a normal or healthy state, whereas low and high values are associated with pathological states of schizophrenia and PTSD. Therefore, amygdala activation in the intermediate range is linked to an optimal functional state, even though the underlying mental feature of this association is ignored (Fig. 1C) .
How can we then approach the neural basis of specific mental features? In this opinion paper, we aim to show that there is a continuous relation on a functional level between the possible range of neural expression and an associated mental feature that is non-linear and forms an inverted U-shaped curve. We review studies in healthy and patient populations that investigated mental features and synthesize the results that suggests a new approach -instead of determining differences between healthy and patient groups, quantifying the continuous relationship between a neural measure and the functionality of a mental feature can provide a better understanding of the brain and its disorders. A crucial aspect of this neuro-mental approach is to first determine a mental correlate of a neural measure and to recast the quantification of this mental feature in terms of its 'functionality'. In other words, a mental feature is not merely measured in an absolute manner but also viewed in terms of whether it serves its intended behavioral purpose.
We also shed light on healthy brain function by utilizing studies in various disorders to describe this approach. In doing so, we bridge the divide between healthy and patient populations. The neuro-mental relationship, in terms of functionality, follows a non-linear inverted-U shaped curve that is applicable across normal and pathological states, which can be indexed according to the degree of neural expression.
Relating neural mechanisms to mental features -linear versus nonlinear relationships
Traditionally, a linear relationship between neural and mental features is presumed -the higher the degree to which a neural mechanism is expressed, the better the respective mental feature is expressed. Consequently, higher values are inferred to be optimal for mental functions (see also (Holmes and Patrick, 2018) for an evolutionary view on what is optimal). In the same vein, low degree of expression of the neural mechanism is considered to be suboptimal, and pathological for the respective mental feature in psychiatric disorders. For instance, imaging studies demonstrated reduced neural variability in the sensorimotor network in the depressive stage of bipolar disorder, which was further associated with psychomotor retardation in these patients (Martino et al., 2016a,b; Northoff et al., 2018) . In this example, one may infer that a low degree of neural variability impedes psychomotor function, and that a high degree of neural variability may be required. This line of reasoning thus assumes a linear relationship between neural variability and psychomotor function. This relation can be described as "high is good, low is bad".
However, data do not conform to the "high is good, low is bad" model. Martino et al. (2016a,b) and Northoff et al. (2018) demonstrated that neural variability in the sensorimotor network is higher than normal in the manic state of bipolar disorder, and is associated with psychomotor hyperactivity. Thus, amygdala activation as well as neural variability in the sensorimotor network across disorders show that high levels of neural expression are not conducive for normal function.
The implicit presumption of such a linear model of neuro-mental relationships in neurology and psychiatry stands in stark contrast to models in medicine (Canguilhem, 1991) and biology (Jonas and Jonas, 2001; Schiff and Fins, 2016) where non-linear models are dominant. The linear model assumes that only low degrees or values in the expression of a specific mechanism leads to suboptimal or pathological Fig. 1 . Linearity assumption in analyzing neural changes in patients, its limitation, and comparison to a non-linear model. In a typical study, a neural measure in a patient group is compared to a matched control group (A, B). A significant difference in the group means is assumed to reflect an abnormality in the region or measure. However, in this approach, the focus is on the difference in the neural measure between the groups, rather than on the continuum with possible degrees of the neural measure across groups. The linear model only considers the consequence of one extreme in expression of the neural measure (inadequate expression in B). In case of overexpression of the neural measure, the functional status of the group (indicated by '?' in B) remains unclear. We suggest that there exists a continuum of different degrees in the neural measure with an optimal range that is associated with 'normal' mental function. Outside this optimal range shifting to either extreme, i.e., too much or not enough expression, mental function is disrupted and leads to 'pathological' states (C). When plotted as a relation between a neural measure and functionality of mental features like, for instance, self or consciousness, an inverted U-shaped model is revealed (C). manifestation of the respective behavioral or mental features. This relationship stands in contrast to non-linear models, where the expression of both low and high degrees of a specific mechanism leads to suboptimal and ultimately pathological functioning. Here, each mechanism has a characteristic range of expression that is associated with optimal functioning. The optimal values typically fall in the middle of an inverted U-shaped curve. Therefore, considering the physiologically possible range of expression of a neural mechanism, a non-linear model shows that "average is good, extremes are bad".
A classic example that highlights a non-linear model while also bridging biology and mental features is the relationship between glucose, insulin, and the level of consciousness. Both, extremely low and high levels of glucose and insulin lead to suboptimal or abnormal mental states, i.e., lost or clouded consciousness. In contrast, intermediate or average values of glucose and insulin are necessary for an optimal mental state, i.e., normal consciousness. This relationship between glucose/insulin and consciousness can thus be described as nonlinear and demonstrated graphically as an inverted U-shape Fig. 2 . Example of a biological model. (A) Homeostatic regulation by insulin maintains blood glucose level (in simple terms) in a narrow range (in green) that is optimal for metabolic and mental functioning. Outside this range on both ends (in yellow), the functional state remains normal but the biological state is abnormal and represents a suboptimal or risk state. Further deviations on either end (in red) lead to a dysfunctional states, e.g., clouding of consciousness. Thus, the biological mechanism consists of a continuum with a range of insulin expression that maintains blood glucose homeostasis, which is necessary for optimal metabolic and mental functioning (i.e. consciousness) as manifested in normal behavior. (B): An inverted U-shaped model relating neural mechanisms to the functionality of mental features. In this model, the focus lies on measuring the expression of a neural mechanism (represented on the x-axis) over a continuous range. A corresponding mental feature that is linked to the said neural mechanism would also show a range of expression. Importantly, the y-axis represents 'functionality', i.e. the degree to which the individual is able to function given various degrees of expression of the mental feature. Hence, the degree of functionality associated with the expression of the mental feature corresponds to the degree of the neural measure. The expression of the neural mechanism in the intermediate range (in green) is expected to lead to an expression of the mental feature in a manner that is optimal for mental order or functioning. Expression of the neural measure outside the optimal intermediate range, is expected to be associated with changes in the functionality of the mental feature that are 'normal' but fall in a suboptimal zone (in yellow), representing a state of increased risk for mental disorder. Further extremes in the neural measure (in red) are associated with an expression of the mental feature that is dysfunctional and occurs in a 'pathological state' as it leads to impairments in behavior. relationship ( Fig. 2A) . Instead, if a linear model were to be assumed, it would predict increasing levels of consciousness with increasing levels of blood glucose. This is clearly not the case.
Inverted U-shaped models have recently been introduced in neuroscience. For instance, such models have been shown to characterize the relationship between the concentration of neurotransmitters (like dopamine, acetylcholine, and noradrenaline) and the degree of neuronal activity (at the cellular level) (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Bentley et al., 2011; Cools and D'Esposito, 2011; Luksys et al., 2009; Vijayraghavan et al., 2007) . Recent data suggest that such an inverted U-shaped relationship also extends to the mesoscopic scale -intermediate degrees of neural activity measured with local field potentials (reflecting activity in a neuronal populations) were associated with optimal behavior in the form of high hit rates and reaction times (He and Zempel, 2013) . Based on this result, the authors concluded that medium or average values of neural activity is best or sufficient for "optimal behavioral performance" (He and Zempel, 2013) . This example shows that the inverted-U shaped model not only holds on the molecular level of neurotransmitters but also on the systemic level of behavior and with regional neural measures like local field potentials.
Function versus functionality
In our approach, the functionality of a mental feature or behavioral measure is considered to be crucial. Here, the degree of expression of a particular measure is not the primary outcome of interest; rather whether the function serves its intended purpose is important. For example, in the regulation of blood levels of glucose, the biological purpose, in simple terms, is to provide adequate energy for metabolism and not to increase glucose levels to the maximum extent. Similarly, local field potentials are not simply elevated in response to stimuli but increase to the extent necessary for executing the response. In the same way, it is likely that neural variability in the somatomotor cortex occurs to the degree necessary to facilitate motor movements, and amygdala activation occurs to the degree needed to signify emotional salience.
Let us consider the consequence of excessive expression of the measured variables on functionality in the above examples. Blood levels of glucose beyond the optimum range adversely affect the biochemical milieu, and are associated with hyperosmolarity and loss of consciousness; increased amplitude and frequency of LFP are seen in seizure states; increased neural variability in the somatomotor cortex was found to be associated with psychomotor excitation in the manic phases of bipolar disorder; excess amygdala activation is seen with excess reactivity to stimuli in PTSD.
Thus, an optimum level of expression of a neural measure is required for normal functionality. The central thesis of this paper is to show that such an inverted U-shaped model also holds for the relationship between neural mechanisms and mental features. We present four examples of mental features that include perceptual synchronization, consciousness, sense of self, and time speed perception where current evidence supports a non-linear neuro-mental relationship. Results across the divide of normal and pathological studies in neuroscience and neurology/psychiatry show that only intermediate degrees of expression of a specific neural mechanism lead to an optimal manifestation of the respective mental features. In contrast, low and high extremes of expression of the same neural mechanism is associated with suboptimal or pathological manifestation of the mental feature (Fig. 2B ).
2. Inverted U-shaped relationship between neural mechanisms and mental (dys)functioning 2.1. Inverted U-shape relationship I -excitation-inhibition balance, perceptual synchronization, and schizotypy personality 2.1.1. Background
We are bombarded with a multitude of stimuli from different sensory modalities. These stimuli may occur at slightly different time points. Despite the asynchronous occurrence of these multisensory stimuli, we are nevertheless able to integrate them into our perception in the form of a temporally unified event. The temporal range over which asynchronous multisensory stimuli can be integrated is called the temporal binding window (TBW) . The TBW is prolonged in individuals with autism and schizophrenia (Stevenson et al., 2017) . These individuals show increased temporal integration and decreased temporal resolution in multisensory perception (see ) for a detailed discussion). Prolongation of the TBW is also observed in subclinical subjects with increased degrees of schizotypy personality, which indicates proneness to psychosis (or schizophrenia) (Ferri et al., 2017) . Ferri et al. (2017) investigated the neural, biochemical, and genetic correlates of TBW and schizotypy in healthy subjects. The TBW of subjects was determined as the duration of asynchronous audio-tactile stimuli that were reported as a unified event. The authors hypothesized that the frequencies of the brain's spontaneous (or resting state) activity mediate the neural link to the TBW. Long-range temporal correlations (LRTC), indexed by the power law exponent (PLE), were expected to be related to the TBW. The equation ∝ P 1/f β (where P is power, f is frequency, and β is the PLE) describes the relation between power and frequencies in the brain's spontaneous activity (He, 2014 (He, , 2011 . A high PLE value indicates stronger power in slow frequencies relative to power in high frequencies (Chialvo, 2010; Hardstone et al., 2012; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2001; Manning et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2009; Palva et al., 2013) .
Further, it was hypothesized that, because LRTC are linked to excitation-inhibition balance (EIB), the TBW may also be related to biochemical and genetic indices of EIB. Glutamate and GABA, which are the principal mediators of EIB, were measured in the auditory cortex using magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS). A genetic EIB score calculated on the basis of polymorphisms in the expression of glutamate and GABA in these subjects. This score indicated the relative balance in excitation or inhibition in each subject.
Neural data
As hypothesized, a higher PLE in the auditory cortex on fMRI, indicating stronger power in slower frequencies relative to faster ones, predicted a shorter TBW. Moreover, biochemical and genetic measures of EIB were also related to the TBW. Subjects with a low biochemical concentration of glutamate in the auditory cortex and low genetic EIB scores also exhibited a low PLE and a long TBW.
A crucial finding of this study was that high genetic and biochemical EIB scores were also associated with a longer TBW and low PLE (Fig. 3A) . Notably, these subjects also scored high on schizotypy. In contrast, a short TBW was only present in subjects with low schizotypy, intermediate or averages values of glutamate concentration and genetic EIB scores, and exhibited a high PLE. (See Fig. 3A for an overview of the results).
Neuro-mental relationship
The TBW is a mental feature of multisensory integration. Ferri et al. (2017) show that this mental feature is negatively affected by extreme values on either end of the range of biochemical and genetic expression of EIB. By also linking the extremes of EIB to schizotypy, the authors show that extreme neural values even in otherwise normal individuals impair their functionality, while intermediate values favor optimum functioning. These findings are in accordance with the model of an inverted U-shaped relationship between genetic/biochemical measures on the one hand and mental features (i.e., schizotypy and TBW) on the other. As this study was conducted only in healthy subjects, the results show that the inverted U-shaped relationship is also applicable within the 'normal' range. Extreme biological values in the healthy or 'normal' range can distinguish between optimal and sub-optimal mental functioning ( Fig. 3B) .
As schizotypy is a risk factor for psychosis, extreme values on either end of the spectrum of the 'normal' range can also be seen as a transition zone towards a pathological state of manifestation of mental features such as in autism or schizophrenia. The TBW in schizophrenia patients is also altered in audiovisual perception and linked to hallucinations (Capa et al., 2014; Foucher et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2013; Stevenson et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2018) . Moreover, the TBW is also altered in autism (Foss-Feig et al., 2010) and epilepsy indicating that a common neuro-mental feature may be affected across these states. Neural correlates of TBW in these disorders are lacking at present, and could extend the proposed model to the pathological range. Accordingly, although more findings are needed, the data indeed suggest a continuum from schizotypy to schizophrenia that is in line with the current model of an inverted U-shape.
To summarize, the mental feature of TBW was optimal (as indicated by their schizotypy score) only when the EIB scores (genetic and biochemical) were optimal. At the functional level, a shift in EIB to either extreme is associated with reduced temporal multisensory perception and high schizotypy. On a more mechanistic level, these findings suggest that the temporo-spatial dynamics of the resting state, e.g., scalefree activity, is transformed into the temporal features of the TBW on the mental level. Temporo-spatial dynamics may, at least in this and possibly in other instances, thus seem to provide a "common currency" Fig. 3 . A: Relationship between excitation-inhibition balance (EIB), temporal binding window (TBW) in multisensory perception, and schizotypy personality. The figure summarizes the results from Ferri et al. (2017) . Multisensory perceptual synchrony was measured by the TBW (see main text) in healthy subjects along with their schizotypy personality score. EIB was measured in each subject with two measures -a genetic score based on polymorphisms in the glutamatergic and GABA-ergic genes, and glutamate and GABA in the auditory cortex by magnetic resonance spectroscopy. In addition, subjects underwent resting state fMRI. Subjects with low schizotypy showed intermediate values of TBW, power law exponent (PLE, from fMRI data), and EIB. Subjects with a prolonged (or shortened) TBW (in multisensory perception) showed a corresponding increase (or decrease) in PLE and EIB; in both cases schizotypy, and hence, risk for psychosis/autism was high. B: Inverted U-shaped relationship between EIB and psychosis. Recasting the data from Fig. 3A in terms of functionality yields an inverted U-shaped curve where optimal TBW (multisensory perceptual synchronization) occurs in the intermediate range (in green) of EIB and PLE. A shift in the degree of EIB and PLE (in yellow) is associated with an apparently 'normal' TBW, which however implies a risk for psychosis. Individuals with schizophrenia show a prolonged TBW (in red) but neural data (about PLE and EIB) in this cohort are still lacking. As suggested by the figure, EIB and PLE may be shifted further to the right in schizophrenic patients, potentially exhibiting low PLE and increased EIB.
of neuronal and mental features: the temporo-spatial features on the neuronal level are manifest and thus transformed into the subjectively perceived temporal features of the TBW (see also (Northoff et al., 2019) for the concept of "common currency").
2.2. Inverted U-shape relationship II -long range temporal correlation (LRTC) and the richness of consciousness 2.2.1. Background
In the second example, we focus on the relationship between consciousness and neural frequencies. Consciousness is considered as the ability to experience specific contents, i.e., objects or events, in a subjective way as featured by a specific quality, and/or to access the contents of that experience (Block, 2005; Changeux, 2017; Dehaene et al., 2017) . It is classically expressed by the rhetorical question -'what it is like' (Koch, 2018; Koch et al., 2016; Nagel, 1974; Northoff, 2013a; Tononi et al., 2016) .
The neural mechanisms of the contents of consciousness remain unclear. Various neuroscientific theories of consciousness have been proposed such as the Integrated Information Theory , the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Changeux, 2017; Dehaene et al., 2014) , entropic brain hypothesis (Carhart-Harris, 2018; Carhart-Harris et al., 2014) , and the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC) (Northoff, 2013b; Northoff and Huang, 2017) . As it is not central to the purpose of this article, we will not go into the details of these theories, which have been discussed elsewhere (see (Northoff, 2013a (Northoff, , 2018 for overviews). Here, we focus on LRTC (long-range temporal correlations) in neural activity, which has been investigated in various states of consciousness.
Consciousness is commonly described in terms of contents or richness and in levels. Richness refers to number of events or objects that are perceived, and level refers to the degree of consciousness, such as in minimally conscious state (MCS), sleep, and wakefulness. The contents of consciousness can become increased to an abnormal extent. Such extremes occur in states induced by drugs (psilocybin, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), or ketamine) (Atasoy et al., 2018 (Atasoy et al., , 2017 CarhartHarris et al., 2016; Schartner et al., 2017; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016; Viol et al., 2017) .
Drug-induced states can therefore be considered an extreme instance where the contents of consciousness are experienced in an abnormally rich manner in quantitative and qualitative terms (CarhartHarris, 2018) . It can be said that richness of consciousness is extended beyond its "normal" or average range. The opposite occurs if the richness of the contents of consciousness is reduced. This state is observed in sedation, early sleep stages (N1 and N2), and MCS where consciousness becomes clouded and restricted (Laureys, 2005; Tononi et al., 2016) .
Neural data
Recent studies (fMRI and E/MEG) on drug-induced psychosis (using ketamine, psilocybin, LSD, and/or ayahuasca demonstrated increased power in the faster frequencies (Atasoy et al., 2018 (Atasoy et al., , 2018 CarhartHarris, 2018; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016; Schartner et al., 2017; Viol et al., 2017) . In contrast, power in the slower frequencies was preserved. The relative power balance was thus shifted toward the faster frequencies, which results in a lower PLE (Fig. 4A) .
Interestingly, sleep deprivation shares a commonality of increased arousal with drug-induced psychosis, which manifests as increased vigilance and sensitivity to stimuli. Similar to drug-induced states, sleep deprived subjects also show lower PLE values (on EEG) (Meisel et al., 2017) . Although it is not clear whether common behavioral and neural changes extend to an increased level of consciousness, the finding suggests that neural and behavioral changes similar to the drug-induced state can occur in the absence of the drug. Hence, the behavioral state (and presumably level of consciousness) is tied to the neural state rather than the drug.
The opposite state of sparse contents of consciousness occurs during early sleep stages (N1 and N2), sedation, and loss of consciousness. In these states, opposite changes occur in the power spectrum. Power in the faster frequencies is reduced while power in the slow frequencies (0.01 to 0.1 Hz) is preserved or abnormally increased as demonstrated in both fMRI and EEG/MEG (Fingelkurts et al., 2012; He et al., 2010 He et al., , 2008 Huang et al., 2018; Lewis et al., 2012; Sitt et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2018) As measured in the respective frequency ranges of fMRI (0.01 to 0.1 Hz) and EEG/MEG (0.1-100 Hz), the balance between the frequencies is thus shifted towards the slower ones, which as the data suggest, is associated with diminished content-richness of consciousness. Reflecting the relative power increase in slower frequencies, studies reported increased PLE during sleep (N1, N2, and N3 stages), sedation, MCS, and anesthesia Meisel et al., 2017; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016 Tagliazucchi et al., , 2013 Zhang et al., 2018 ) (note -Huang et al., 2018 used autocorrelation function).
Neuro-mental relationship
Taken together, PLE provides an index of neural activity and shows a linear relation to the contents of consciousness -high in states of increased richness of consciousness and low in states of sparse contents of consciousness. It is important to note that both these states with increased or decreased contents of consciousness are sub-optimal. Individuals in either extreme state are unable to function in day-to-day life. In contrast, PLE values in healthy awake subjects fall in the intermediate range between the two extremes, reflecting an appropriate balance of power between the slower and faster frequencies. Here too, an inverted U-shaped relationship is demonstrated between the neural measures (PLE) and functionality of content-richness of consciousness (Fig. 4B) .
This inverted-U shaped relationship is reinforced by moving towards one extreme -complete breakdown of consciousness seen in coma or deep surgical anesthesia. In these states, the LRTC of spontaneous activity and thus of its scale-free operation completely breakdown Tagliazucchi et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2018) . Accordingly, the neural measure also moves towards the extreme end with very low values of PLE. One may speculate that at the opposite extreme, for instance, during states induced by abnormally high doses of the above-mentioned drugs, the PLE value will be very high. However, no studies to our knowledge have reported such results. (see also (Carhart-Harris, 2018) ).
Finally, it shall be noted that, on a more mechanistic view, the observed relationship of PLE and contents of consciousness supports those theories of consciousness that emphasize the central role of the brain's temporo-spatial dynamics; these include especially the temporospatial theory of consciousness (TTC) (Northoff, 2018 (Northoff, , 2016 (Northoff, , 2014 Northoff et al., 2019; Northoff and Huang, 2017) as well as others like the entropy hypothesis (Carhart-Harris, 2018) and the Operational time-space theory (OST) (Fingelkurts et al., 2010) . Assumption of information integration, like in the Integrated information theory (IIT) , and access to global workspace, as in the Global Neuronal Workspace theory (GNWT) (Dehaene et al., 2017 , may then need to be related to the brain's temporo-spatial dynamics.
2.3. Inverted U-shape relationship III -medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) resting state/task-evoked activity and the sense of self 2.3.1. Background A sense of self is a central feature of our inner mental life. What do we mean by self? Psychological investigations describe a self-reference effect (Northoff et al., 2006; Rogers et al., 1977; Sui et al., 2012; Sui and Humphreys, 2015) . Contents related to oneself in various psychological functions including memory, perception, emotions, and decisionmaking show higher degrees of accuracy and faster reactions (Nakao et al., 2013; Northoff, 2016; Sui and Humphreys, 2015) . In addition to self-reference, other cognitive functions related to the self include selfexperience, self-awareness, self-reflection, self-attribution, and selfmonitoring (Philippi and Koenigs, 2014) . For the sake of simplicity, we refer to these functions as sense of self, self-consciousness, or self-focus.
The sense of self is related to neural activity in specific regions of the brain. When participants are asked to judge trait adjectives (own vs other) or other stimuli (like auto-vs hetero-biographical events, or own vs other names), the resulting task-evoked activity strongly recruits the ventro-and dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), ventral anterior cingulate and posterior cingulate cortex, which together form the socalled cortical midline structures (CMS) (Huang et al., 2014; Murray et al., 2015 Murray et al., , 2012 Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2010) . It should be noted that the CMS are not specific to the self as they have been implicated in other internal processes like emotion regulation, mind wandering, and social interaction (Christoff et al., 2016 (Christoff et al., , 2009 Schilbach et al., 2012) .
Spontaneous neural activity organizes the brain into networks, of which the default mode network (DMN) closely overlaps with the CMS Fig. 4 . A: Scale-free activity, as measured by the power law exponent (PLE), and content-richness of consciousness. Temporal correlations in neural activity are scale-free, as seen in the schematic power spectrum. The PLE, which is the slope of the power spectrum, provides a measure of the relative distribution of power in slow and fast frequencies. The green line represents the power spectrum in the conscious awake state in normal individuals. A shift in the power spectrum in either direction, towards slow or fast frequencies, is associated with an altered state of consciousness. Specifically, a shift in the power spectrum towards faster frequencies is seen in druginduced psychosis where the contents of consciousness are increased. The opposite case is seen in sedation where contents of consciousness are reduced and power is shifted towards slow frequencies. In the extreme case of anesthesia, the relation between slow and fast frequencies, and thus the power-law relationship itself, break down altogether. B: Inverted U-shaped relationship between scale-free activity and the content-richness of consciousness. The figure shows the relation between power-law scaling in neural activity and the functionality of contents of consciousness. The balance between slow and fast frequencies is measured by the PLE. The optimal state (conscious and awake) is associated with a degree of PLE in the intermediate or average range (green). In contrast, a change in the PLE (in yellow) indicating a shift towards either slower or faster frequencies occurs in the sleep and sleep-deprived states, respectively. A further shift towards either slower or faster frequencies (in red) is associated with pathological states such as sedation and anesthesia (towards slow), and drug-induced psychosis (towards fast). States indicated in the yellow and red zones indicate poor functionality on the mental level of consciousness either due to too few or too many contents of consciousness.
(D' Argembeau et al., 2005; Davey et al., 2016; Qin and Northoff, 2011; Schneider et al., 2008; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011) . Moreover, recent studies show that the temporal structure of spontaneous activity (measured by PLE), autocorrelation window, and cross-frequency coupling) in the MPFC predicts the degree of self-consciousness (Huang et al., 2016; Wolff et al., 2018) . This "rest-self overlap" (Bai et al., 2016) not only shows the convergence between the self and the spontaneous activity of the brain but also allows for inferring changes in the resting state to changes in the sense of self.
The sense of self is affected in major depressive disorder (MDD) and in the depressive phase of bipolar disorder (dBD). In these cases, the sense of self is abnormally increased -thoughts revolve around oneself, and are associated with negative emotions like sadness and guilt (Hamilton et al., 2015) . This is described as increased self-or internalfocus as a typical psychopathological hallmark of depression in general (Northoff, 2014; Northoff and Sibille, 2014; Northoff, 2007; Northoff et al., 2011) . In contrast, the focus of depressive patients towards the external environment is strongly reduced. Thus, there is an imbalance between increased self-focus and decreased environment-focus.
Neural data
Various studies show that task-evoked activity in the dorsal MPFC during self-reference is abnormally elevated in depressed MDD patients (Lemogne et al., 2012 (Lemogne et al., , 2010 Li et al., 2017; Nejad et al., 2013; Renner et al., 2015; Sarsam et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2015) . At the same time, task-evoked activity in the ventral MPFC exhibits reduced deactivation, i.e., the magnitude of the negative BOLD response during is lower (Grimm et al., 2011 (Grimm et al., , 2009 Lemogne et al., 2012) . Because the degree of deactivation or negative BOLD response in VMPFC reflects the degree of cognitive involvement with externally-directed attention (Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997) , reduced deactivation in this region can be considered to indicate increased internal self-focus and internally-directed attention (Fig. 5A) .
Increased task-evoked activity during self-reference in MDD is complemented by studies that consistently find increased resting state activity in the dorsal and ventral MPFC in MDD (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2017; Hamilton et al., 2015; Kaiser et al., 2015) . Analogous findings are also observed in dBD where the same regions show abnormally increased neural activity in the resting state (Martino et al., 2016a,b) .
Mania forms the opposite clinical picture of depression and as studies show, it also has the opposite mental and neural features. In mania, internal or self-focus is decreased, and external-or environment-focus is increased (Martino et al., 2016a,b; Northoff, 2007) . As expected, manic patients show reduced task-evoked activity in the MPFC during selfreferential stimuli (Herold et al., 2017) and posterior cingulate cortex (Zhang et al., 2015) . Moreover, resting state activity in MPFC is decreased in mania as measured by functional connectivity and neural variability (Martino et al., 2016a,b) .
Neuro-mental relationship
These results show that extremes of self-focus are associated with abnormal behavioral states of depression and mania, and these extreme states are related to extremes in neural activity in the MPFC in the resting and task-evoked states. Thus, activity in the MPFC is associated with balance between self-and environment-focus (Fig. 5B) .
Accordingly, opposite extremes on the neural level lead to opposite extremes on the mental level with both ends of this spectrum being suboptimal and even pathological, favoring an inverted U-shaped model between neural mechanisms (MPFC activity) and mental function (self-focus). Intermediate degrees of MPFC resting state and MPFC task-evoked activity are thus optimal for a sense of self where the internal self-focus is balanced with external environment-focus. In contrast, too high or too low neural activity in the MPFC leads to suboptimal manifestation of the sense of self.
On a more mechanistic level, this suggests that the self may allow for integrating internal and external contents and thus exert what has recently been described as 'integrative function of self' (Sui and Humphreys, 2015) . For instance, the self may allow integrating the external contents of perception of objects in the environment with the more internal contents of our inner thoughts. That integration of internal and external contents seems to be abnormally tilted towards either the internal or external contents which, importantly, also goes along with different degrees in the expression of self. This suggests that the degree of expression of self is closely coupled to the balance of internal-external contents.
2.4. Inverted U-shape relationship IV -neural variability and time speed perception 2.4.1. Background A central element of consciousness is the perception of time -this is reflected in William James' (1890) description of "stream of consciousness". In addition to projecting ourselves into the past and future (Schacter et al., 2012) , perception of the speed of time is central to our "stream of consciousness". Even if an event unfolds at an objectively slow speed, we may nevertheless perceive it as fast if we are fascinated by or drawn into the event -afterwards, we will say "time flies" entailing that our subjective time speed perception was faster (with a perceived shorter duration of the event) than the objective physical time duration of the event itself. The opposite is the case if we are bored; in that case, time does not move at all in our subjective perception so that we will perceive the duration of the event much slower and longer than it actually was.
Psychiatrists like Thomas Fuchs (2013) distinguish between inner and outer time speed perception. Inner time speed perception describes our own personal time, that is, how one perceives the speed of the own self as either slow or fast. While outer time speed perception is about how the subject perceives the speed of events or objects in the outer world.
In healthy subjects, inner and outer time speed perception are synchronized. In depression and mania, time speed perception is highly abnormal, albeit in opposite ways. Depressed patients show abnormally slow inner time speed perception -"nothing changes for them", which ultimately results in the perception of a complete "standstill of time" (Fuchs, 2013; Jaspers, 2014; Northoff et al., 2018; Stanghellini et al., 2017) . While their outer time speed perception is too fast as they perceive events and objects in the outer world as too fast and changing rapidly (even if they are objectively slow) -patients feel easily stressed as soon as they are confronted with external demands. The opposite pattern is observed in mania (Fuchs, 2013; Northoff et al., 2018) . Manic patients perceive their inner time and their self as extremely fast while the events and objects in the outer world are perceived as too slow. As in depression, there is an imbalance between inner and outer time perception.
Neural data
During tasks of inner time speed perception, healthy subjects show the involvement of regions in the somatomotor network (SMN) including the supplementary motor area (SMA), premotor cortex, medial and superior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal cortex, posterior insula, and subcortical regions like thalamus, pallidum and putamen (Ortuño et al., 2011; Wiener et al., 2010; Wittmann, 2013) . Since these regions are apparently involved in the perception of inner time speed, they have been described as a "neural timing circuit" (Stevens et al., 2007; Tipples et al., 2013) . In contrast, primary sensory cortices like the visual cortex or visual network (VN) may mediate outer time speed perception as they are the first cortical encounter of external stimuli with the brain .
Time speed perception on the perceptual level is about change in events. On the neural level, variability of ongoing activity can be considered to be an index of the degree of change. Different methods have been used for this purpose including variance of the signal, mean sum of squared deviations, and root mean square of the difference in signal amplitude from time point to time point (standard deviation -SD) (Garrett et al., 2013) .
This facilitates a specific neuro-mental hypotheses. High SD in the SMN, indicating large changes in the amplitude of spontaneous activity, can be expected to be associated with fast perception of inner time speed, and low SD in the SMN can be expected to be related to slow perception of inner time speed. Analogously, SD in the VN can be expected to mediate outer time speed perception.
Results in depression and mania confirm this hypothesis . As expected, depressed bipolar patients showed decreased SD in the SMN accompanied by abnormally high SD in the VN, which accounts for their perception of abnormally slow inner time speed and abnormally fast outer time speed. The perceptual imbalance between inner and outer time speed in depressed subjects may thus be related to imbalance in neural variability in SMN and in VN (Fig. 6A) . In manic bipolar patients, the opposite pattern was observed. SD was increased in the SMN and reduced in the VN, which is consistent with the subjective perception of abnormally fast inner time speed and abnormally slow outer time speed (Northoff et al., 2018) . The psychopathological symptoms were also correlated with SD in SMN and Fig. 5 . A: Relationship between medial prefrontal cortical (MPFC) resting state/task-evoked activity and self-focus. Activity in the MPFC is linked to self-focus, which indicates the degree to which thoughts related to oneself are processed and perceived. For example, depression is associated with increased self-focus (rumination and excessive self-related thoughts), accompanied with reduced focus on nonself related or external thoughts. In these patients, MPFC activity is found to be increased. In mania, the opposite case occurs with reduced self-focus and increased focus on the external environment. In these patients, MPFC activity is reduced. These neural changes are present during taskevoked states as well as in the resting state. B: Inverted U-shaped relationship between MPFC activity and self-focus. Viewing the degree of self-focus with respect to functionality, both increased and decreased self-focus are associated with increasingly pathological states. Both increased and decreased self-focus are related to abnormal activity in the MPFC -either too high (increased self-focus) or too low (decreased self-focus). In contrast, the 'normal' state with optimal functioning shows intermediate activity levels in the MPFC. This is related to an intermediate degree of the internal self-focus and is presumably in balance with external environment-focus. Accordingly, both high and low extremes in MPFC activity lead to poor functionality. VN, and the ratio of SD in SMN and VN. These symptoms were correlated with SMN-VN SD ratio but not with the SD in the single networks themselves. This result suggests that the balance between the SD of the two networks rather than the SD of each network is central to time speed perception. The de-synchronization between inner and outer time speed perception can thus be traced to a corresponding imbalance in SD between SMN and VN (Fig. 6B) .
Neuro-mental relationship
Both extremely low and high degrees of neural variability in SMN and VN lead to suboptimal inner and outer time speed perception on the mental level in depression and mania states of bipolar disorder. In contrast, average values of SD in SMN and VN, as observed in healthy subjects, allow for temporal synchronization in the perception of inner and outer time speed, and thus for mental order. Together, this follows the inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of the neural mechanism (SD SMN-VN balance) and the balance between inner and outer time speed perception across the normal and pathological spectrum. Thinking about potential diagnostic markers, these and other (Martino et al., 2016a) findings suggest that we may want to focus more on balances or ratios between neuronal networks rather than on single neuronal measures (like the neuronal networks themselves). Hence, what seems to be important for functionality is the balance between different neuronal networks which may then also operate as a potential diagnostic marker.
Discussion
We presented four examples from recent neuroimaging research about the relationship between neural mechanisms and mental features Fig. 6 . A: Relationship between neural variability (SD) in sensorimotor and visual networks and inner and outer time speed perception in depression and mania. Neural variability in the visual and sensorimotor network together is associated with inner and outer time speed perception. In other words, the relative balance of SD in the two networks may determine the perception of time speed. An increase in SD in the visual network along with a decreased SD in the sensorimotor network is associated with the perception of fast outer time and slow inner time, which occurs in depression. In contrast, decrease in SD in the visual network and increased SD in the sensorimotor network is associated with the perception of fast inner time and slow outer time, which occurs in mania. Note, the change in SD in either of the two networks alone does not correlate with the perception of time speed. B: Inverted U-shaped relationship between neural variability and time speed perception. The data from Fig. 6A show that a shift in the balance of SD in the visual and sensorimotor network (VN and SMN) is associated with a change in the balance between inner and outer time speed perception. A shift in either direction is associated with a decline in the functionality of time speed perception. When the balance of SD shifts towards the VN (decreased SD in SMN and increased SD in VN), inner time speed is perceived as slow and outer time speed is perceived as fast. This state is observed in anxiety and depression. A shift in the SD balance towards the SMN (SD increased in SMN and reduced in VN) is associated with inner time speed being perceived as too fast and outer time speed as too slow. This state is manifested in mania. Accordingly, in both extremes of SD balance, the individual's balance between inner and outer time speed perception becomes dysfunctional and negatively affects behavior.
across the divide of normal and pathological states. Despite their differences, all examples show that intermediate or average degrees in the expression of a neural mechanism lead to optimal manifestation of the respective mental feature. Extreme degrees of the same neural mechanism induce suboptimal expression of the same mental function. Thus, we propose that the neuro-mental relationship is non-linear and forms an inverted U-shaped model. Below, we discuss the implications of the inverted U-shaped model for our understanding of the neuromental relationship in healthy and pathological states.
"Neuro-mental spectrum" and non-linear relationship
In addition to demonstrating that extreme neural values are suboptimal for functioning, the above examples show that the range of possible values of a neural mechanism corresponds to a range of expression of mental features. We describe this as a "neuro-mental spectrum". Importantly, this neuro-mental spectrum, captured by an inverted-U shaped model provides a bridge between the normal and pathological states. In a linear model, low and high degrees of expression of a neural mechanism are expected to lead to opposite degrees of functioning of the respective mental feature. Thus, a sharp boundary between "normal" and "pathological" states, as expected in a linear model of neuro-mental relationship may not be precise. The inverted Ushaped model suggests that a continuous transition exists between the "normal" and the "pathological" states where an optimum range of neural expression defines the optimal mental state. This view aligns clinical neuroscience with that of medicine and biology (Canguilhem, 1991; Jonas and Jonas, 2001; Schiff and Fins, 2016) .
The assumption of an inverted U-shaped relationship between neural mechanisms and mental features carries major methodological implications for investigations of the relationship between neural and mental features in normal and pathological states.
Linear statistical models will fail to capture the inverted-U shaped relation, and as suggested by the first example, this may also be true for healthy subjects. At best, linear models can be expected to capture either the ascending or descending part of the inverted-U relationship. As a result, only one half of the "normal" neuro-mental relationship is quantified. At worst, no significant relation will be found in such models and inferred as the neuro-mental relationship being absent. Thus, it may be necessary to also estimate a multivariate fit in such studies, especially in large samples where a wider neuro-mental spectrum can be expected (Johnson and Wichern, 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007) .
Recently, limitations of conventional statistics are being pointed out. Emphasis is being laid upon moving away from determining significant group differences and towards reporting effect sizes, confidence intervals, and using adequate sample sizes (Amrhein et al., 2019; Button et al., 2013) . As noted, investigating group differences leads to the study subjects being conceptualized as categorically different, thus creating a false dichotomy (Amrhein et al., 2019) . In addition to these widely known statistical issues, our proposal also implicates symptom variability within samples in psychiatric studies as a contributing factor. As a continuous neuro-mental relationship is suggested, investigating the statistical spread of the neural as well as mental measure of interest maybe important.
Neuro-mental transformation and internal-external content balance
Here, we used examples of abnormal states to demonstrate a link between neural measures and mental functions, implying an underlying neuro-mental transformation. Although, the mechanisms of this transformation are not clear, evidence indicates that temporo-spatial dynamics of neural activity modulate the expression of mental features. For example, mental features such as perception and attention are shown to be oscillatory in nature in the order of milliseconds (Busch et al., 2009; Helfrich et al., 2018) . That is, perceptive and attentional capacity goes through peaks and troughs. Remarkably, the capacity of these mental features are coupled to the phases of neural oscillations. For example, external visual stimuli are best perceived at the troughs of alpha oscillations (8-12 Hz) (Busch et al., 2009) . It has been suggested that such neural dynamics facilitate switching between internal and external modes of processing, which allow for building and updating models of the world (Honey et al., 2018) . Thus, the temporo-spatial dynamics of neural activity may provide a 'common currency' of neuromental transformation (Northoff et al., 2019) .
Mental features can be represented under an overarching scheme of internal and external contents. The relation between the internal and external mental contents can be considered to be balanced and the corresponding neural dynamics to be optimal in healthy individuals. A shift in neural activity would then lead to a corresponding shift in the balance between internal and external contents, which would be associated with sub-optimal mental functioning. We elucidate this principle of neuro-mental transformation in Fig. 7 . The temporal dynamics of neural activity represented by its frequency are posited to be directly linked to a psychomotor speed. In healthy individuals, this activity results in optimum psychomotor function. A slower or faster frequency of neural activity is associated with a slower or faster psychomotor speed, which are symptoms of depression and mania, respectively. 7. Neuro-mental transformation: "common currency" for neural and mental features. The thematic figure desccribes a putative model for the transformation of neural activity into mental features and its relation to mental disorders. For example, the frequencies of neural activity may be related to psychomotor speed. In healthy subjects (b), a 'normal' frequency range is likely to be associated with optimal psychomotor function. A slowing in neural frequencies would be associated with psychomotor retardation as seen in major depressive disorder, whereas faster neural frequencies would be associated with psychomotor excitation as seen in the manic phase of bipolar disorder. In this schema, temporo-spatial dynamics form the common currency between neural and mental features. Accordingly, a shift in neural dynamics will lead to a corresponding shift in mental features and thus to symptoms of various disorders. Accordingly, understanding the full range of the relationship between internal-external content balance and mental feature expression will allow for determining where an individual lies on this continuous spectrum. That, in turn, will foster the development of diagnostic and therapeutic markers such as the precise neural parameters to be modified. Below, we consider the implications of such a proposal for classifying mental disorders.
3.3. Non-linear inverted U-shape and the dimensional classification of mental disorders
Traditional systems like the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD 10) by the World Health Organisation (World Health Organization, 1993) presuppose a categorical (present or absent) view of mental disorders. In a nutshell, such a categorical approach assumes the presence of a neural mechanism with "normal" mental function while its absence leads to "pathological" manifestation as in a mental disorder.
This approach has been challenged by the recent proposal termed Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), which assumes mental disorders to be dimensional rather than categorical and to be based on alterations in neural circuits (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013; Insel et al., 2010; Insel, 2014) . Another cognitive-based classification is 'Cognitive ontology' (CO) that aims to provide a cognitive atlas with standardized description of cognitive processes and mental concepts which can be applied to mental disorders (Bilder et al., 2013 (Bilder et al., , 2009 Hastings et al., 2014; Poldrack et al., 2011) . The Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP) aims to advance the assessment of psychopathology and personality (accounting for both, transient and stable maladaptive traits). Individual's signs and symptoms are combined and grouped into a dimensional continuum in the personality between internalizing and externalizing symptoms (Kotov et al., 2018 (Kotov et al., , 2017 .
Despite their different foci -neural circuits, cognitive processes, and personality features, these novel classification systems presume a continuum between "normal" and "pathological" manifestations of mental features. Hence, they are called dimensional classifications and termed as 'dimensional psychiatry' (Hägele et al., 2015; Heinz et al., 2016) . However, they do not describe a neuro-mental relationship that can account for such a dimensional view with smooth transitions between the "normal" and the "pathological" states.
Our proposal of an inverted U-shaped relationship between neural mechanisms and mental features provides an operational model for these dimensional classification systems in psychiatry. This model allows for a range in the expression of a neural mechanism which can bridge the artificial boundary between "normal" and the "pathological". Therefore, it fills an important gap in the proposed dimensional classification systems of psychiatric disorders (Fig. 2B) .
The dimensional nature of inverted U-shape relationship requires novel methodological approaches in psychiatry. A concrete example can be seen in an early investigation on catatonia, a psychomotor syndrome that can occur in various disorders including schizophrenia and depression (Northoff, 2002) . Emotional stimulation was investigated in subjects with catatonic and non-catatonic schizophrenia and depression (major depressive disorder/MDD) . Compared to healthy subjects, changes in the lateral prefrontal cortical in schizophrenia and depression were found. However, this result does not reveal the neural correlate of catatonia. When catatonic subjects (with schizophrenia and MDD) were compared with noncatatonic patients and healthy subjects, changes in orbitofrontal cortex and orbitofrontal-premotor cortex were found. These changes were assumed to be related to catatonia rather than its parent disorder (MDD and schizophrenia) (see also (Martino et al., 2016a,b) for comparison of psychomotor inhibition and excitation across bipolar depression, MDD depression, and schizophrenia). Extending the above example to psychiatric disorders in general, it can be expected that a specific degree of neural expression is linked to a specific degree of expression of a mental feature, and is not specific to a diagnostic category.
Conclusion
The relationship between neural and mental features is subject to intense debate. Traditional models assume linear relationship entailing that higher degrees in the expression of a neural mechanism lead to better and more optimal manifestation of the respective mental feature. We here demonstrate that such linear model of neuro-mental relationship does not conform to the data when conceiving results from across the divide of normal vs pathological states. Presenting various examples from recent research on neuroimaging, we show that only intermediate or average degrees in the expression of a neural mechanism lead to optimal, e.g., "normal" manifestation of the respective mental feature -"average is good". In contrast, the data show that extremes at both ends, i.e., "too low" and "too high" degrees of the same neural mechanism lead to suboptimal, e.g., "pathological" manifestation of the same mental feature. Together this corresponds to a non-linear model with an inverted U-shape relationship between neural mechanism and mental feature.
Put in a nutshell, the inverted U-shape model entails that, concerning the degree of expression of the neural mechanism, "average is good, extremes are bad". This provides a novel view of neuro-mental relationship which carries major implications for both neuroscience and neurology/psychiatry. The non-linear inverted U-shape model allows connecting neural and mental features in a novel way, i.e., in terms of neuro-mental transformation, in the neuroscience of the healthy brain. At the same time, the inverted U-shape model enables us to understand both inter-individual variability and the normal-pathological continuum in psychiatry as an intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) feature of the brain's way of processing neuro-mental relationships.
